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Life in the First Person and the Art of Political 
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Papandreou 
 
 
 Nick Papandreou #  
 
ABSTRACT 
This essay analyzes Andreas Papandreou’s skill as a political “story 
teller.” For a great majority of the Greek population, it is his narrative, 
his tale of modern Greece, the essay argues, that has become the 
accepted one. It was his narrative that helped bring and keep him in 
power for eleven years. One of the building blocks was an innate talent 
to draw conclusions and persuade the audience using events from his 
own personal experience – life in the first person. Another element was 
his academic background and a natural linguistic fluency. The analysis 
emphasizes his rhetorical devices and draws from the tropes of 
literature (metaphor, simile, suspense) to complete the standard 
portrait usually provided by political scientists and historians.  
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Life in the First Person and the Art of Political 
Storytelling: The Rhetoric of Andreas 
Papandreou 
 
1. Introduction 
Prime minister of Greece for most of the 1980s, my father, Andreas 
Papandreou was by all accounts, allies and enemies, a formidable 
politician. But he was also an economist, a scholar, a political tactician, 
an enthusiast of jazz and rembetiko music, a fan of Greek tavernas but 
also five star restaurants, intensely social, but also someone who could 
not do without philosophical enquiry, who was deeply moved when a 
fellow human suffered from serious illness. He was also filled with 
insecurities, twice imprisoned for political activism. He had three 
marriages and five children from two different wives, a citizen of Greece, 
the United States and, for a short time, of Norway and Canada, a harsh 
critic of capitalism, a social democrat with revolutionary tendencies, 
skilled in using words, and a politician who “shifted entirely the terms 
upon which the Greek political system operated.1”  
He believed in a Greece that belonged neither to the Warsaw Pact nor to 
NATO, a country that would follow its own “third” path. His political base 
consisted mainly of the “small-scale entrepreneur,” the 
“underprivileged,” the farmer and the student, all those who had little to 
no access to power. Polymath, polyglot, gracious but overpowering 
                                                 
1
 Konstantine Tsoukalas, Ana-gnoseis, Kastantiotis Publications, 2002, pp. 184-85, chapter on Andreas 
Papandreou. 
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when he wanted to be, beloved and hated, he wrote an endless stream 
of articles, fifteen books, and made thousands of speeches, sometimes 
delivering as many as ten speeches a day in full campaign mode. The 
crowds he drew in the major cities have been recorded as the largest in 
modern Greek history.  
He officially entered Greek politics in February 1964, where he ran as a 
candidate for Parliament for the party of which his father was the 
leader. Three years later he was in solitary isolation in Athens’ Averoff 
prison. The prison was not entirely unfamiliar to him, since he had 
visited it once before in 1923, when he was only four years old, to visit 
his father during one of the latter’s numerous banishments and exiles.2 
Though they denied him pen and paper, what the prison authorities 
could not deny him was the ability to reflect on the past and analyze the 
present. While under close surveillance by the prison guards through a 
flap in the door, with frequent changes of guard duty in order to 
preclude the development of “dangerous” personal relationships, with 
sparse information from his rare visitors — mostly family members— 
Andreas found time for analysis. Alone with himself, he began to work 
out his personal account. It was the start of an internal process that 
would result in his first political book, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek 
Front3, but, even more importantly, would lead him to speak about 
himself in the first person, and give him the tools for original and 
captivating speeches.  
                                                 
2
 Cf. Andreas G. Papandreou, 1919-1986, volume I ((in Greek), by Katerina Varela, Ellinika Grammata, 
Ellinika Grammata, 2002, p. 118. 
3
 Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front, Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1971, 360pps, as well as the Greek 
translation, Η Δημοκρατία Στο Απόσπασμα, Εκδόσεις Καρανάση, Athens, 1974. Pagination from Greek 
version.  
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2.  Politics in the First Person 
From the moment that he adopts the first person, he has to 
acknowledge his own mistakes. He has to answer for his deeds, first of 
all to himself. In his book he would write about the self-doubt that 
frequently overcame him during his imprisonment. “What did I do 
wrong?  Could I have done it otherwise? Why is the fate of my country 
being decided with me closed in a cell?  Are my accusers perhaps right? 
Perhaps I overdid it with my radical and “revolutionary” positions? Did I 
go too far? Perhaps, as my father asserted on the night of the coup, I 
myself had put the country on this hazardous course.”  
The question cannot be answered at that time with any finality. He was 
obliged again to answer it publicly three years later, when, as the leader 
of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK). Here is answer is better 
formed. If he were to do anything differently, he says, it would be to 
organize a grass roots movement, a movement capable of reacting to 
any efforts to overturn a democratically elected government. Unique in 
the constitutions of the world, after 1981 he will amend the constitution 
to allow soldiers to refuse order if such orders violate democracy. (Upon 
his return to Greece after the fall of the dictatorship, with the ghost of 
the junta still in the air, he indeed organizes a grass roots movement 
party, called PASOK.)  
How successful was Andreas’ venture into first person narrative? We 
have some first evidence from his book. In Democracy at Gunpoint we 
witness his reaction to the news that he will be released from prison: 
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From the moment I heard the news, until my actual release, I suffered 
more than I ever had. The hours seemed endless. As the hours passed, 
my doubts grew. I now could see the horrible ugliness of Averoff prison 
in its fullness, because now I no longer had to hide it from myself. I did 
not need to control my feelings, to impose on myself the harsh self-
discipline required by the long-term imprisonment that I believed 
awaited me [p. 404]. 
Leaving Greece with his family in 1968, under difficult circumstances, 
having seen his father for the last time, he writes: 
As the plane took off, the sun was rising in Attica. Sophia [his daughter] 
fixed her gaze on the blue sky. I love Greece, she said. And then she sank 
into silence. We too followed suit. [p. 404] 
Minimal with enormous force, this chapter closing is literary through and 
through. A few more examples from his Democracy at Gunpoint 
illustrate his literary skills: 
“The nearly beardless 20-year old,” he says of the former king, 
Constantine, “admonishes the 70-year old political veteran,” that is to 
say, Andreas’ father (p. 159). About an American official, he writes: “Tall, 
with an athletic build, Campbell was very affable.” In a few effortless 
pen-strokes identifying a few specific characteristics, he captures the 
essence of the person, manifesting the basic touches of a genuine 
writer. “[The Yugoslavian] General Popovich was short and slight, but 
with a supernatural energy, so it seemed, with rapid movements and a 
thin mustache.”  And his brief but pointed comments on society: “The 
Athenian dream was a distorted Western model—the refrigerator, the 
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automobile, ‘la dolce vita’.” His talent for “detail”, a talent we recognize 
in great writers, will later appear in his speeches. 
Aside from the text of Democracy at Gunpoint, the first verbal 
manifestations of his skill as a story-teller are found in the speeches he 
gave while in exile, usually on the raucous campuses of American 
universities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He emerged as a popular 
speaker in caucuses and sit-ins and the wide range of Sixties student 
activities because he was a harsh critic of a US foreign policy, the same 
foreign policy that supported the dictators that had put him in jail. As a 
man who had been jailed, he had solid street cred with the crowds. At 
the core of these university held speeches (for which he never used a 
written text) was a political narrative that went something like this:  
Beginning with his arrival in the United States in 1940, he would explain 
how he studied at Harvard and joined the US Navy to fight in the Second 
World War. Before the war he had supported Wallace and after the war 
he worked with Adlai Stevenson, Hubert Humphrey, and Eugene 
McCarthy – the “liberal” politicians of America.   
In this way, he established his credibility in the eyes of the campus 
students, avoiding the label of the mindless anti-American, clueless 
about the nature of the country’s strong democratic system. With a rich 
vocabulary and a Bostonian accent, he bore the markings of the 
progressive American intellectual. This last element certainly 
contributed, in the eyes of Americans, to his charm, while at the same 
time gratifying the Greeks, who saw one of their own prospering in his 
second homeland.  
  6 
The snapshot version of his full narrative, which would be the one he 
developed as he came closer and closer to power, is worth providing 
here: Greece, a small country, has been buffeted by civil war and 
dictators. The conservatives have subservient to the needs of America’s 
Cold War policy, which require denying the rights to a large portion of 
the Greek population. However, with his progressive leadership at the 
helm, and with the vocal support of the Greeks themselves, the country 
slowly makes its own distinct voice heard and finally frees itself of all 
foreign domination. With the people finally in power, the country 
expands the space for democracy, provides equal rights for all, and joins 
the ranks of all independent modern nations as an equal member.  
In the following extract from an unpublished speech, (AGP Archives) we 
observe the narrative-in-the-making. His rhetorical technique? He 
introduces himself into the narrative in a way that gives the audience 
the satisfaction of sharing in events, of being part of history, of 
discovering the nexus of relationships between Greece and the USA, just 
as he himself had:  
So when I was in Greece, (before the coup d’état) the Americans told me: 
“Why don’t you do the right thing? The country in fact must seek to 
modernize, and you, the men of the Center, are the bearers of this 
modernizing spirit. There should be changes. But, be careful, take care 
not to disturb the system of power in Greece, the system that governs 
Greece—which is to say, the Greek establishment that is maintained by 
foreign services. Don’t ever raise the question as to who governs Greece, 
the King or the people. Don’t ever raise the question whether the army 
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belongs to the nation or to the Americans. [AGP Archives, speech given 
to members of PAK, Toronto, July 25, 1973] 
Thus in simple, straightforward language, he recounts the relations of 
Greece and the U.S. as he perceived them. The method is theatrical, 
dramatizing the case as an invented dialogue between the United States 
and Greece.  
His talent for presenting ideas to the public developed out of his years as 
an American professor of economics. The academic however does not 
speak about himself as part of the material he is teaching. Still, the 
functions of teaching and writing scholarly articles had taught him to put 
his ideas in logical order, to follow a linear narrative, to obey the rules of 
evidence and “structure,” to move from point to point in logical 
sequence, and, finally, to reach a compelling conclusion. 
His academic experience is certainly the reason that frequently, after 
following a speech in Parliament, both friends and enemies would 
portray it as “academic.”  “Andreas again was our teacher,” they would 
say, meaning that he had made a presentation with a logical structure, a 
comprehensive totality. He had, in a certain way, told a “story.” 
Combined with this ability to organize his thoughts were his recent 
experiences in Greece’s political life, where he had the opportunity, for 
the first time, to try his hand at political rhetoric. The two together—
that is, structured thought and political experience—synthesized by an 
innate and underexploited literary talent, created something 
unexpected: a narrative of modern Greece that, in a large part, was a 
compelling “read.”  
  8 
The successful use of slogans that he invented over his political career – 
what we now call sound bites – was a natural instinct for him and useful 
in instantly shaping public opinion. For example, in 1983, with public 
attitudes broadly favorable to labor actions, Andreas reversed public 
support for a pilot strike at Olympic Airlines by referring to the pilots’ 
high wages as “penthouse salaries.” Thus, in a single night, he managed 
to deflate their cause, depriving them of broad public support for their 
demands. He called the pensions of the Right “starvation pensions” and 
on the eve of coming to power in 1981, he signed a “contract with the 
people.” Again the 1981 victory was an “appointment with history,” and 
would serve to right the wrongs for the underprivileged and 
disempowered. As for the right, he has been endlessly quoted as saying: 
“The people do not forget what it means to be governed by the Right,” a 
phrase which rhymes in modern Greek and often shouted loudly by 
crowds at PASOK speeches. (Ο λαός δεν ξεχνά τι σημαίνει η δεξιά).4  
His use of similes and metaphors to capture the political pulse was not 
the only thing that gave his narrative unusual force. Also contributing to 
its impact was something less palpable—something that functioned 
unconsciously, almost indefinably, giving his spoken word a disarming 
persuasiveness. When he spoke, he made it seem as if he himself were 
hearing his story for the first time. We discover the truth about Greece 
at the same moment he himself “discovers” it. This lent his speeches a 
powerful freshness.  
                                                 
4 The phrase/slogan was recently re-quoted by an important member of the SYRIZA party. 
Lafazanis to attack the governing party, upon revelations of secret discussions between the governing 
party and key members of the Nazi Golden Dawn, party. April, 2014, Greek Parliament.  
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For example, one does not know at the outset of his speeches just who 
the good guys and who the bad guys are. Of course he knows. But it 
sounds as if he has not yet made up his mind. We learn who is who as 
each character’s actions unfold before our eyes, giving the narrative a 
distinctive sharpness and suspense.  
In one of his discussions during the years of exile (1968-1974) he 
recounts a conversation, not many months before the coup, with the 
American ambassador in Athens. This tale is used to support his 
conviction that the United States had put the colonels in power. The 
setting was a lunch-meeting he and his father had with the US 
Ambassador, Philips Talbot. Here is Andreas’ account of their exchange. 
“I am very worried about developments in Greece… Because,” [Talbot] 
said, “there is a slogan which you have started, and it has caught on and 
spread across Greece and I’d like you to explain it to me. The slogan 
which you are constantly shouting is ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks.’  
What does that mean?  Why do you make that statement?” 
And we said, “Well, doesn’t it belong to the Greeks, shouldn’t it?” 
“No”, Talbot said, “I am not saying it shouldn’t. But the way in which you 
say it suggests that you believe that it doesn’t belong to the Greeks, that 
it belongs to us.” 
And then we said: “But that is what we believe, that it belongs to you 
and it shouldn’t.” 
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“But,” he said, “Mr. Andreas Papandreou, since 1962, we have ceased to 
have any influence in Greece, we have no influence.” (AGP Archives, 
Toronto, July 25, 1973) 
In speaking to the representative of the great trans-Atlantic superpower, 
Andreas subtly mocks the ambassador. He uses the plural “we said,” to 
include the audience who presumably would give the same answer as 
their political leader. This produces deep satisfaction in his politicized 
audience. But the simplicity of expression and use the dialogue is no 
mere rhetorical trick. They reflect his remarkable ability to elucidate 
complex political situations in a straightforward manner, using live 
examples. And of course it provides one of the building blocks for the 
modern narrative of the conservatives’ dependence on American foreign 
policy. 
Frequently in his speeches of that period (1968-1974), he engages in 
historical retrospective, evoking individual freedoms and other 
Enlightenment values. He analyzes the political economy and the rivalry 
of the two superpowers and the role played by dictatorships in 
suppressing independent peoples. He discusses struggles in the Third 
World for national independence, criticizes the members of the Soviet 
bloc as illiberal regimes that repress their own peoples.   
For Andreas, the crushing of the 1968 “Prague Spring”, when Soviet 
tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia, was an event parallel to what had 
happened in Greece. Both reflected the refusal of the superpowers to 
allow small, peripheral countries to emerge from their satellite status 
and become independent nations. To legitimize this view historically, he 
cites Greece’s struggles against Ottoman Empire or the more recent 
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German occupation. His choice of the word “liberation” for the name of 
his anti-junta organization—the Panhellenic Liberation Movement 
(PAK)—resonated with Greeks who had been nurtured on stories of the 
1821 War of Independence and the WWII Occupation. 
At a dinner-event that took place in July 1971 for members of PAK 
Toronto—largely working class Greek immigrants—he analyzed the 
Greek Right’s flawed policies for dealing with the demands of the Great 
Powers. He describes Greece’s geo-political position as “extremely 
useful” to the USA in its conflicts with the Soviet Union over the Middle 
East, leading the US to support a brutal military dictatorship that it 
regarded as necessary to secure Greece’s militarily useful space for its 
“expansive autocracy.” The geo-political references to Algeria, Libya and 
Malta, are only part of his analytical, academic interpretation of events, 
but also raise the morale of the listeners, because it shows that Greece is 
not alone in the struggle—that conflict with the great powers—as in the 
cases of Algeria, Libya and Malta—can lead to independence.  
The same speech also raises the rhetorical question as to why the United 
States finds the traditional Greek Right to be unsatisfactory, why the US 
was unable to find a more palatable way of controlling Greece and was 
forced to impose the junta: 
It was enormously difficult for us to convince a whole range of Greeks—
those playing some kind of a leadership role, either in resistance or 
political movements or in the political parties—who believed that, at 
some point, America would understand its error, would realize that you 
don’t have to have the Greek people in bondage in order to serve your 
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military and economic interests. (AGP Archives, Discussion with 
members of PAK, Toronto, July 1971, author’s translation) 
Andreas then assumes the role of the innocent right-winger puzzling 
over his failure to please Big Brother:  
Finally, from Paris, the exiled leader of the right (Caramanlis) was 
justified in in his complaints to the Americans:  
“Where did I fail you? Didn’t I do my job well? Didn’t I carry out the 
orders you gave me? How was I at fault?” 
“Did we ever place in doubt your sovereign rights, America? Did we tell 
you to take your bases and get out? Did we say that we didn’t want your 
dollars? That we didn’t want your investments? On the contrary, we 
became a welcome mat. Why don’t you want us?  How have we failed? 
[AGP Archives, Toronto, July 1971)  
Following these rhetorical questions comes the “redemption” for the 
listener, who is prepared for the answer that he, in fact, already knows: 
And the answer from the Americans—and we know what it is—is very 
simple: We know you are prepared to serve us. We believe it absolutely. 
But that is not enough, because you are no longer in command of the 
Greek people, something you had managed for some ten or twelve 
years. Who is in charge of the Greek people now? Do you control them, 
Mr. Karamanlis? Do you, Mr. Kanellopoulos? Because I, as America, 
would very much prefer to have the semblance of democracy—to have 
elections, parliaments, rallies, demonstrations—and at the same time 
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maintain respect for our fleet, our air force and our military operations. 
(AGP Archives, Toronto, July 1971) 
He speaks with caustic humor. The Right did everything it could to please 
the United States, but even then the United States was not happy. The 
Right could not “command” the Greek people. Andreas continues his 
narrative from the perspective of the American:  
Something has happened here. This people have woken up. We (note: 
meaning we the Americans) defeated the communist led National 
Liberation Front with a civil war, and the Karamanlis period followed. We 
had said that maybe things would settle down. Then along came the first 
“Unyielding Struggle” (led by Andrea’s father) and we said, let’s see if we 
can manage things. Then came the second “Unyielding Struggle.” (led 
this time by Andreas with his father) Well, things didn’t work out. These 
people cannot be held back except with the heavy presence of arms… 
There is no other way. (AGP Archives, Toronto, July 1971) 
We see here how he sets up the story — sets up, that is, his version of 
contemporary history, a version that begins with the National Liberation 
Front fighting the German Occupation, and then moves directly to the 
Center Union and to his father’s First and Second Unyielding Fights of 
the early 1960s. He implies that, in the current phase, the torch has been 
passed on from the civil war guerrillas, to his grandfather, and now to his 
very own resistance movement, with Andreas himself the leader of such 
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an organization, an organization that will soon, so the story goes, bring 
the disenfranchised Greeks to power.5 
The conclusion of his analysis is that the people, on their own, have 
rejected the Right: 
The Greek people have rendered the [traditional] political leadership 
useless because they reject being played the fool. The Greek people are 
not about to offer “solutions,” except under the gun, so to speak. Left 
free, they would surely direct the country just as they wanted. This 
maturity has arrived in Greece. American services realize this even more 
that our own.  And for this reason, the United States has identified itself 
with the junta, with Papadopoulos, with military rule in Greece. [PAK 
Toronto, July 1971, AGP archives.] 
Today, perhaps, this analysis does not seem so original, mainly because 
this narrative has become the central narrative of modern Greece. It is 
an analysis embraced by a large segment of the Center-Left and is 
embraced by most people today as the authentic narrative of the 
country’s political history. While some of Andrea’s ideas have been 
articulated by others, Greece’s historical narrative has never been 
presented so comprehensively, free of the traditional analyses that 
dictate the positions of the Center, the Right or the traditional Left. 
But don’t all politicians create a political narrative?  That is true. An 
important facet in a politician’s life is the use of stories to explain the 
world in which they move. These stories are the basis for their 
“image”— the myth attached to them, marking their personal passage.  
                                                 
5
  «Ο λαός στην εξουσία» was one of PASOK’s powerful slogans, meaning literally «People in Power.» 
This slogan implied that until the coming of PASOK, the people were in fact, not in power.  
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The stories that politicians offer pertain to their political positions. 
Sometimes they persuade, sometimes they fail to wake even a mouse. 
Successful leaders are those who not only shape events, but also shape 
the interpretation of those events. Such leaders leave their stamp on the 
society. Politicians who are leaders do not accept the given narrative. 
They propose a new one, one that - if they themselves are a truly great 
public figure - make them part of the commonly-shared and accepted 
history. To a large degree, Andreas Papandreou convinced people of the 
need for change, an analysis which differed from that of the Left, Center, 
or Right.  
And that is why he finally earned massive support from the Left, Center, 
and Right. People of differing backgrounds and ideologies felt part of a 
large progressive patriotic movement, one that wished to change 
Greece. That is perhaps why today, with the disintegration of PASOK, its 
supporters have spun away helter-skelter into the original components 
parts: some support the SYRIZA party, some the communist, some the 
right, and some the extreme right Nazi party Golden Dawn. Today’s 
implosion of PASOK has led to an explosion of the extremes. The 
progressive center vanished, bloating the remaining parties in 
unexpected ways. 
Calling someone a “patriot” before Andreas appropriated and re-shaped 
that word meant you belonged to the right. The communists were 
considered traitors and the right claimed to be the “true” patriots of the 
country. 
The new boy on the block, Andreas, claimed you could be a patriot 
without being a rightist-nationalist. He appropriated that term and made 
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it possible for all Greeks to call themselves “patriots” without 
automatically implying that they belonged to certain political party. In 
this way he took the wind out the right-wing sails. But he also proposed 
social policies that resembled those dreamed of by the partisans fighting 
the Germans. Thus a large number of left-wingers came over to his side. 
Progressive social policies plus a “Greece first” foreign policy succeeded 
in uniting disparate people under one large political party.  
3. ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’ 
Finally, let’s look at another example of the personal style that 
characterizes him in that period, a style characteristic of his talks at 
dinner-meetings. At a dinner-meeting with the Greeks of Germany in 
Aachen in June of 1972, he explained the impact of his signature slogan: 
“Greece belongs to the Greeks.” Note once more that he begins with 
specifics in order to arrive at a broader conclusion regarding Greek 
national consciousness, conveying the sense of sharing something of his 
own experience: 
From 1965-67, I toured most of Greece and spoke in countless villages—
this I think you know. I spoke on average of fifteen times every weekend. 
Thus I got to know a large cross-section of farmers, mainly, but also 
workers. You will remember the slogans that grew out of the second 
Unyielding Fight—some already existed from the first.  But “Greece 
Belongs to the Greeks” came out of the second. 
Allow me to say something, and trust my words. I spoke to them then as 
Minister of [Economic] Coordination. I was knowledgeable about 
economic issues and spoke to them about tomatoes and ochra and such 
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like. But let me note the following: All hell broke loose, irrespective of 
age and city, when I stated “Greece belongs to the Greeks.”  Such a 
response to this simple slogan was something I had not expected. 
This is something that has been forgotten and misunderstood. But I have 
not forgotten… Because when Greeks are moved to the point of tears 
around the theme “Greece belongs to the Greeks”, it is because it 
awakens something within them that goes back to at least a century, if 
not five centuries, it reminds the Greek of centuries of occupation, 
slavery and struggle. This slogan symbolized the tomatoes and the 
oranges and the house in rubble, the child who is unable to attend 
university and goes abroad to work—everything, the whole system of 
power, of security files, every aspect of oppression. All of that was 
condensed in this slogan. This became the national consciousness. (AGP 
Archives, Aachen, Germany, June 1972) 
Here we see the “nationalistic” element of his narration, the one that 
united left and right in a Greece first ideology. Who could really disagree 
with the notion that Greece belongs to the Greeks? However let’s also 
pause to look at his particular story-telling technique: The connection he 
makes between political events and his personal experiences generates 
the overpowering narrative core of his speeches. He connects general 
theories about Great Powers and Greece’s struggles for independence 
with tomatoes and oranges, everyday, familiar things.  
He has a right to make this personal connection. After all, he is 
consistent in his stance of militant resistance against the regime. He has 
been in prison. He is a leader from the prior period, and perhaps of the 
next one. Thus his effortless storytelling narrative style, which after his 
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personal take in his book becomes his natural idiom, rounds out his life 
as a political actor. His words and deeds, the stories he tells, but also the 
story of his own life, are what, bit by bit, generate the so-called 
“Andreas” phenomenon.  
Allow me to close this first section by emphasizing something else: 
Apparently he found it difficult to believe that he had actually lived such 
a life. As a good author or narrator, he knew that you can’t convince an 
audience with generalities and theories, but only with specific details 
and instances which you yourself have lived rather than borrowed 
details that arise from secondary sources such as research and reading. 
Musing on occasion before a live audience, he was convinced that all 
that had happened to him after quitting Berkeley to enter Greek politics 
was not just a “dream.”6 He had a need to tell the story of his life, but of 
Greece at the same time, not because he wanted to prove something, 
but because, via personal narration, he discovered his own path and 
thus his own identity, his very self. It was this book he had to write and 
rewrite in order to comprehend the sequence and sense of his life. Just 
as most authors cannot avoid drawing on their own life to create their 
story, so Andreas put his life on display in order to define out his own 
story.  
4. The Narration Comes to Power 
 Andreas’ time in exile is reminiscent of the initiation and training of the 
hero prior to doing battle. He has gathered up his tools: He has 
                                                 
6
 The need to narrate, the need to understand the world just as it is (as both Wittgenstein and Marx 
roughly stated), and finally, the effort to understand his place within it concerned him increasingly. I 
believe that he asked, “How is that I arrived at the place where I am?” He constructed what I call the 
“narrative core” of his life, the story he told himself about himself. 
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perfected his rhetorical arsenal, consolidated his knowledge, acquired 
experience in organizing a movement (PAK had members on five 
continents), grappled with the organizational problems and, finally, 
forged his vision—a vision that began and ended with a deep faith in the 
people and in democracy. 
His return to Greece after the fall of the junta required him to play a new 
role. Once a driving force in the fight to overturn the dictatorship, he 
must now pursue power, abandon the leather jacket of the 
revolutionary leader in favor of the necktie of the leader seeking to gain 
a parliamentary majority.7 
His recent organizational experiences would have a direct impact on his 
strategic moves. “We need to set our sights on creating a massive 
popular base—the majority of Greeks who are both oppressed and 
denied the privileges of the economic oligarchy,” he declared in 1975. 
He would create committees at various levels, he would slowly clarify 
the ideological stance of the movement and, in line with his strategy, call 
for the creation of local organizations, which quickly sprung up across 
the country. “Lots of work!” we would tell the new members in Corfu in 
August 1975. “We must organize. We need a broad based organization 
in all facets of the movement. Local organizations. Labor organizations in 
every facet of public political life.” 
He had to create labor organizations, to engage social groupings, to 
confirm his leadership within the movement, to take care that the party 
went neither too far left, adopting the practices of the traditional Left, 
                                                 
7
 The initials PASOK resembled those of PAK, in order to maintain a sense of historical continuity as 
the single purpose anti-junta organization (PAK) morphed into a mass-based political party (PASOK). 
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nor to identify with the old-style practices of the politicians of the 
Center, the voting base from which PASOK derived much of its strength. 
He won the organizational gamble. By 1977, PASOK had nearly 30,000 
active members. Four years later, in 1981, membership would surpass 
100,000. 
He has a knack for words: He re-defines the out-of-daily-usage word 
establishment (katestimeno) to mean just that, he introduces the term 
retro-active (etero-chronismeno) for pay hikes, he calls government 
changes a re-structuring (anadomisi), a new relationship with Turkey 
(1987) acquires the status of no-war. He draws his metaphors from the 
WII liberation movement, and labels his political enemy as a 
“collaborator” or “national betrayer.” (Compare this briefly to his 
grandfather’s language, which drew from the country’s Byzantine-
Christian inheritance. He once called C. Mitsotakis an Apostate, and it 
has stuck up until today, 50 years later.)8 
Along with creating a new organization, he also needed to give the 
movement a new context, a new story. “Our national independence,” he 
said in talking to the newly-formed PASOK in 1975, (six years before he 
would become prime minister with an overwhelming vote in 1981)  “will 
be guaranteed for us by the non-privileged Greeks, the workers, the 
farmers, the craftsmen, the salaried workers, the small-business 
                                                 
8 Caveat: There is not, to my knowledge, any study on the use of metaphor and language of Greek 
politicians, so these remarks are drawn from my own experience and for that reason subject to 
welcome revision. Nor has their been much research on the quality of Greek political discourse 
through the past century. Nor do we even know which are the “great speeches” of Greek politicians, 
unlike the Penguin book of Great Speeches. In this sphere of interest, the academic community has 
been greatly lacking. This short essay is an effort to draw out such interest and to provoke further 
research on the speech-making qualities of modern Greek politicians, a much lambasted and hooted 
tribe indeed, but whose oral contributions require far greater analysis before being dismissed and/or 
ignored.  
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professionals and the youth.” This is the part of the narrative that 
includes the ones that those in “power” have ignored for decades and 
left out of the country’s story.  
From the start, Andreas identified the ideological framework, the 
language and the social-economic classes that would give PASOK its first 
great victory in October 1981. He put aside the traditional divisions 
between left and right and created a general framework within which 
the vast majority of Greeks had a place. PASOK was a movement that 
arose from the “guts of the people.” Effectively, everyone could 
participate in the great vision of change. In fact, consistent with an open-
door approach, citizens were allowed simply to walk into a local party 
office and sign up, without much ado. Speaking on Greek television on 
the night of the election victory, he would declare, in keeping with the 
overall story: “We are a government of all Greeks.” 
This, then, is one part of the new narrative—a movement or a party that 
represents many classes of people, particularly the “wronged” and non-
privileged, the ones who have a right to come to power but who have 
been left out so far. Leaving aside generalities, he addressed the specific 
problems affecting small craftspeople, pensioner, and farmers—
problems like inadequate irrigation, the lack of local government 
autonomy, the hydra-headed central administration. Yet everything was 
encompassed in the broader vision of a new Greece—a vision 
summarized in a manner accessible in the mid-1970s to every voter by 
PASOK’s key slogans: national independence, popular sovereignty, social 
liberation and democratic processes.  
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His emphasis on the group of entrepreneurs he labeled as “mikro-
mesaioi,” i.e. small to medium sized enterprises, was not simply a 
rhetorical trick to garner yet another group of particular voters into the 
fold of the socialist party. This emphasis was based on a larger theory 
about the path Greece needed to adopt to survive the pressure from 
massive global competition. His political economy analysis (bolstered by 
his Harvard Ph.D. and years of working on the theory of the firm as an 
economist) led him to believe that multi-nationals and their products 
(Coca-cola and the like) could only be competed away by strengthening 
the backbone of local production. It was no accident that one of the first 
policies the dictators took was to allow the import of Coca-Cola, thus 
killing off the local soda producer Tam-Tam.  
For Andreas, increased local production and economic growth would 
come mainly from the small to medium sized entrepreneurs, the only 
class capable of producing quality Greek products that could then 
compete with massive “globalization.” It is no accident that once in 
power, the PASOK government created a whole slew of policies to 
support this particular class of Greeks, with varying degrees of success, 
but this more economic analysis is outside the scope of this particular 
essay.  
5. Open Assemblies 
 In the early years in power he developed a unique manner of 
“governing.” This was to ensure “feedback” from below, through a 
continual give-and-take with the people. For that reason, he initiated 
something unique in the annals of modern European history: The open 
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assembly. This was a forum that approached the limits of direct 
democracy. How did it work? Simple enough: He would bring out the 
whole government and its ministers to engage in open discussions in the 
countryside. Here citizens were allowed to ask the ministers directly 
whatever they wanted, in full view of the all-powerful prime minister. 
Andreas would open up with a speech and then the floor was open. This 
“floor” usually numbered in the thousands. For the first time Greeks 
were able to address their complaints in full view of the government. 
Here was where direct dialogue between all his ministers and thousands 
of people took place, where anybody could raise a hand and ask why the 
school was not yet built, when the road would come, how the port 
would be shaped, and then the ministers were obliged to answer on the 
spot. All this was new. 
For example, let’s take a few lines from his speech at the open assembly 
at the Lasithi plateau in Crete (April 29, 1984), attended by over a 
thousand people from the countryside. 
We have come to hear about where the measures we took succeeded. 
And we want to hear where the measures we took failed. We want to 
hear your criticism. Because our path is always a corrective path, based 
on the hopes, experiences and aspirations of the Greek people. 
(Author’s translation) 
There follow hour-long discussions and complaints, criticism of 
unfinished promises, issues to be resolved, things still to do, plus 
appreciation for the chance to participate without restraint.  
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In Tripoli, Peloponnesus (March 24th, 1984) after three years as the 
country’s Prime Minister, he is still out in the countryside, making direct 
contact with the people: 
This meeting, this conference, has the following unique aspect: That 
through the representatives of the towns, villages and region you come 
into direct contact with the whole government. You place the 
responsibility on us through a dialogue with the people. This interchange 
happens without the intermediate chain of the state mechanism, a 
revolutionary step for the government which opens itself to criticism and 
proposes solutions.  
At a gathering in Thessaloniki a few weeks before, he declared, (March 
4, 1984), “we need your strength and optimism in order to make a 
steady advance. But we also need your criticism and your oversight in 
order to overcome our weaknesses, to test the validity of our choices, to 
correct our mistakes. We don’t only want to speak, but more to hear. To 
respond and to persuade. To rebaptize ourselves and to draw 
inspiration.” 
The Ministers were then asked to respond to the complaints and to do 
something about them when they returned to Athens. I don’t think this 
element of Andreas’ managerial approach to governing has been studied 
enough to determine it’s effectiveness. What did the ministers do when 
they got back to their offices? It certainly served as a form of mass 
participation.  
These popular assemblies laid the foundations for a vibrant and 
demanding local governments. Whoever had the chance to hear the 
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popular assemblies cannot forget them. I myself attended quite a few 
back then. One could sense the culmination of a twenty-year journey 
coming to a head in the countryside of Greece. As many as three 
thousand people would “dialogue” with the ministers, while Andreas 
played the role of coordinator and “main man.”  
*** 
Change was the slogan that he used in his third and final election that 
brought him to power, a most neutral word that had little ideological 
connotations. It did not attack America, it did not talk about patriotism, 
it said simply enough: “Change.” And in 1981, it seemed there were few 
Greeks who did not want change. This slogan replaced the older and 
more ideologically loaded triptych: popular sovereignty, national 
independence, etc.  
In the 1985 elections, the slogan was adeptly transformed to “Forward 
for completion of the Change,” implying that many things were still 
needed to accomplish genuine social change. Rather Orwellian in its 
admittance of unfinished work, this slogan - which included an implied 
self-criticism - was seen as accepting the failings of the government. 
Once again PASOK resoundingly won the 1985 elections. No other party 
even tried to engage the population in open and direct dialogue. The 
right-wing party emulated PASOK in starting up local cells all over the 
country, but it was too little, too late. The conservatives were unable to 
rid themselves of their instinct to micromanage and overcontrol things 
on all levels. In fact they feared the people. This half-assed approach 
quashed the very essence of the experiment - which was to allow local 
cells to flourish spontaneously. Only PASOK, alone among all Greek 
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political parties, allowed for and succeeded in creating such a dynamic 
and spontaneous grass roots movement.  
As the years in power grew, the man who entwined his personal story 
with Greece’s political history found it increasingly necessary, however, 
to limit personal expression. The workload of political activity and the 
intense pressures it brought distanced him ever more from the free 
narrative in the first person. Let’s not forget that the crucial turning 
point that led him to speak in the first person happened while he was in 
solitary confinement. Now he is flooded with the blurry whine of power, 
the endless speeches, appointments, decisions, conferences, dinners, 
party activity and the like.  
By the late 1980s, it is nearly impossible to locate him within his 
speeches. Here is the paradox of power: At its center, he is the “prime 
mover” and will, for many years still, be the master of the political game. 
But he no longer has the luxury to weave his own personal tale. He can 
no longer talk in the first person.  
Meanwhile, the management of power interested him less and less, 
perhaps because management meant conflict at a personal level, 
something which, by nature, he loathed. He told my younger brother 
Andrikos sometime in 1987, after six years as prime minister, “I no 
longer trust anybody, not even myself.” This is the end of the romance 
of the struggle. It is the end of any illusions about power.  
Power surprised him. Micromanagement of daily routines, firing and 
hiring, and being in charge of the awful system of patronage, where the 
ultimate word is always from the man at the top, was against his way of 
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thinking. The routine tasks of governing, such as the decision as to who 
would be in the cabinet and who not, never engaged him, because it was 
not a creative act, and above all, involved no intellectual challenge. 
His long time in power (eight years, from 1981 to 1989, and then a Coda 
of three more, from 1993 to 1996) increasingly wore him down. In 
practice, social transformation is difficult, but while many successes 
were achieved—the creation of a health care system, substantive 
decentralization, the rise in farmers’ living standards, the recognition of 
the National Resistance, Greece’s maturation in the eyes of the Atlantic 
Alliance, his steady line in relation to Turkey, the consolidation of 
democracy and realization of the concept of “people power”— he 
seemed to find satisfaction in nothing except for foreign policy – 
dramatic when it came to challenging American policy in the 
Mediterranean. He also enjoyed the adrenaline of election campaigns, 
which challenged him by igniting his political survival instincts. He was 
however unable to speak with that singular interplay of personal and 
political analysis that he had adopted during the years of exile and which 
drove his popular open air meetings in the early 1980s.  
By that point the narrative had been firmly established and you would 
be hard pressed to find a Greek who did not borrow elements of the 
original story that he had helped shape. Sure the emphasis might be 
different depending on one’s political stripes, but the idea that Greece 
had slowly grown up and that power had indeed been given to the 
people was generally accepted.  
His free and captivating manner of expression, his unique capability for 
creative narrative continued to be a dominating feature only at more 
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intimate gatherings and dinner-meetings, providing a source of personal 
gratification. Under the burden of daily political activity, it, at some 
point, abandoned him.  
This absence of creative activity perhaps explains his disastrous fall from 
power, which began with a torrid love affair with a younger woman. The 
sheer boredom of running a difficult country was replaced by the 
adrenaline of being with a woman forty years his junior. Humbled in the 
elections of 1989, losing the crucial vote of women because of his 
flagrant adultery, indicted by his opponents, he became the leader-
scapegoat.  
The right-wingers who believed that the government was theirs by 
birthright had sharpened their knives and went for the jugular, nearly 
succeeding in putting him in jail. He survived the court case against him 
and regained power in 1993, only to die of a heart attack under difficult 
and nightmarish bed - time politics in June 1996.  
With the end of his ability to put himself in the center of the narration, 
to be the hero of his own story, he was no longer able to produce. 
Nonetheless, he was on the verge of a new narration after his “second 
coming,” his electoral rebirth in 1993. Following an EU meeting in 
Cannes in 1995, he went on television and spoke about the new 
European Directorate. “There is a plan to diminish national sovereignty,” 
he said at the televised interview in Cannes, “and to reduce the power of 
democratically elected governments. At this meeting I felt I was a 
foreigner. I saw the new directorate in action.” This was not the Europe 
of Mitterrand and Kohl, not the Europe he recalled in his previous tenure 
as Prime Minister. This was a new Europe, the Europe of two speeds. 
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Cannes was the starting point. Germany was becoming the new America, 
already dictating terms to the rest of the EU member-states. But this 
new narrative – barely drawn - was ignored. Ailing physically, lacking his 
old persona, he no longer had the stamina to take on yet another 
superpower, nor to mobilize Greece to protect itself from the new 
Germano-centric Europe. He did promise to “take the fight into the 
heart of Europe,” but he never got the chance.9 Today, over twenty 
years later, his words sound prophetic. But back then nobody wanted to 
listen. 
In those final years, at the dinner table among family and friends, he 
preferred to talk about his years as Chairman of the Berkeley economics 
department, which after what I call the inevitable sickness of power, 
must have seemed to him like a blissful period of creativity and 
intellectual discourse, a paradise lost. His deteriorating health and the 
time required to run the country robbed him of precisely these creative 
attributes, the ones which kept him alive and kicking back in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, the elements that had fueled the engine of his life for 
so many years.  
6. Afterword 
    The sway that his narrative still has over the Greek citizen is clear in 
the fact that all the parties today have stolen bits and pieces of PASOK 
rhetoric. Tsipras, the leader of the left, has modeled his words and even 
his oratory on Andreas – even his enunciation and hand movements are 
recognizable as an outright copy. Tsipras  recently claimed, in a speech in 
                                                 
9
 See televised speech, Cannes, 27.6.1995, http://bit.ly/1fW5pkz.  
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Constitution Square, (2013) that one the most important events in 
modern Greek history were George Papandreou the elder’s electoral 
victory in 1963 and PASOK’s victory in 1981.  
The Golden Dawn Nazi party uses Andreas Papandreou’s main slogan 
from the 1960s: “Greece Belongs to the Greeks!” The so-called 
Independent Greeks party asks for the “true Greeks of PASOK, the 
nationalists,” to vote for them. Now that everybody is dancing on the old 
man’s grave, we should not be surprised that his tomb is being raided. 
Andreas Papandreou’s legacy is still hotly debated, especially now, when 
Greece finally confronts its problems seriously, after years of avoiding 
them. The man may be physically absent, but his ghost is powerfully 
present.  
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